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ABSTRACT
States have passed reinstatement statutes to address the increased number of
legal orphans in the foster care system. For the most part, however, these laws
have been inadequate to address the problem because they are motivated by a
view of terminated parents that does not fit current realities. Terminated parents
have typically been viewed as obstacles to permanence rather than a realistic
placement option. The laws often punish parents who opposed the termination of
their parental rights and reward those who voluntarily signed relinquishments.
Reinstatement statutes alone are inadequate to address the growing concern
over youth aging out of foster care without permanence. Some states provide
parents the opportunity to adopt their biological children (“re-adoption”). A
system that provides for both reinstatement and adoption would offer additional
opportunities for terminated parents and their children to reunite posttermination.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
In a 1995 law review article, Professor Martin Guggenheim coined the term
“legal orphan” to refer to a child whose parents’ rights are terminated in
anticipation of adoption, but who never finds a permanent adoptive family.1 It is
nearly impossible to determine the number of legal orphans in the United States.
According to the most recent Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting
System (“AFCARS”) report, on September 30, 2015, there were 111,820 foster
children waiting to be adopted across the country.2 Of those children, 62,378
have no legal connections to their biological parents.3 This statistic is underinclusive, however, because the number does not include children sixteen years
old and older whose parents’ rights were terminated and who have a goal of
emancipation.4 It also does not include legal orphans whose parents’ rights were
terminated in prior fiscal years.5
Legal orphans languish in a system designed to temporarily provide youth
with legal and relational permanence. Ultimately, they become part of the nine
percent of foster youth who emancipate from the foster care system without any
legal connections.6 Studies show that the absence of a legal parent has negative
social, emotional, and financial consequences.7 Not only do legal orphans
experience the dire outcomes of other children who age out of the foster care
system—including homelessness, criminal involvement, mental and physical
health issues, lower education level, and increased reliance on public
assistance—but the problems are compounded by the fact that these youth have

1. Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of
Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care—An Empirical Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM. L.Q.
121, 122 (1995).
2. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REP. 23, at
1 (2016), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport23.pdf [https://perma.cc/UE5W
-DNZP].
3. Id.
4. Id. at 4 n.3.
5. Id. at 1 n.1.
6. Id.
7. See LaShanda Taylor, Resurrecting Parents of Legal Orphans: Un-Terminating Parental
Rights, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 318, 326–27 (2010).
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an undermined sense of permanency and security.8 In consideration of these
bleak outcomes, states should explore every possible permanent family resource
for youth in foster care, including the child’s biological parent.
Some legal orphans have biological parents who have been rehabilitated and
are now able to care for them. Many of these parents maintain relationships with
their children even after the state has determined that they are not fit to parent
them. Seventeen years ago, as a student advocate in the Family Defense Clinic at
New York University School of Law, my clinic partner and I were assigned to
represent one such parent who wanted her parental rights reinstated.9 Roberta
Green’s10 son had been removed from her care and placed into foster care about
ten years prior. Her parental rights had been terminated because she had not been
able to overcome her drug addiction. By the time we began working with Ms.
Green, however, she had completed drug rehabilitation, was employed, and had
stable housing. She was also providing care for her son, who had aged out of the
foster care system without ever being adopted. By all outward appearances, she
was his mother. Still, it was important to her that the state recognize that she was
both the biological and legal parent to her son.
At that time, there were no statutes that allowed the court to reinstate
parental rights after they had been involuntarily terminated. So, on behalf of our
client, we filed a motion to vacate the original termination order due to a change
in circumstances. The pleading argued that vacation was warranted given our
client’s successful efforts toward rehabilitation, her relationship with her son,
and the negative effects of his continued legal orphan status. After a short
hearing, the motion was granted and her parental rights were reinstated.
Since that time, seventeen states, including New York, have passed laws
permitting parental rights to be reinstated when certain conditions are met.11 On
one hand, these statutes recognize that terminated parents may provide the best
opportunity for permanence for youth who would otherwise languish in the
foster care system. Within that recognition is an understanding that people can
8. Id. at 328–29; Patrick Parkinson, Child Protection, Permanency Planning and Children’s
Right to Family Life, 17 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 147, 159 (2003) (noting that “not chosen” for
adoption is one of the worst possible outcomes for children because it places them in limbo and is
likely to undermine any sense of permanence or security).
9. Because the representation through the Family Defense Clinic was so long ago and for
confidentiality reasons, a case number and case files are unavailable for review.
10. This is a pseudonym to maintain our former client’s confidentiality.
11. These seventeen states are: California, CAL. WELFARE & INST. CODE § 366.26(i)(3)
(Deering 2015); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. tit. 19, § 3-612 (2014); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 13, § 1116 (2013); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-323 (2014); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. §
571-63; Illinois, ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-28 (2010) and 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-34 (2010);
Louisiana, LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1051 (2008); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4059
(2017); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 260C.329 (2013); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 128.160,
128.170 (2017); New York, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT, §§ 635–37 (Consol. 2017); North Carolina, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7B-1114 (2016); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-4-909; Utah, UTAH
CODE ANN. tit. 78A, § 6-1401; Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283.2 (2013); Washington, WASH.
REV. CODE. ANN. § 13.34.215; and Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5125 (2016).
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change—even people who were once deemed unfit to parent. On the other hand,
these statutes reflect a negative and biased view of terminated parents and
present challenges for them and lawyers who represent them.
Specifically, in an effort to create a pathway for post-termination
reunification, the reinstatement laws close avenues to reinstatement that were
previously available. In 1999, when there was no reinstatement statute in New
York, my clinic partner and I were able to petition the court on Ms. Green’s
behalf. Although we thought this concept was novel, parents across the country
had, in fact, already made similar requests.12 Before reinstatement statutes,
biological parents employed a number of legal strategies to regain some, if not
all, of their parental rights. In addition to motions to vacate the termination
order, birth parents petitioned the court to adopt13 or obtain custody or legal
guardianship of their biological children.14 They also moved to be declared the
child’s presumed parent.15 When permitted to file, parents had party status or an
opportunity to be heard or were an integral part of the proceeding to restore their
rights.16 By contrast, very few state reinstatement statutes grant the biological
parent standing to petition the court for the reinstatement of her rights, grant the
parent party status, or provide for the appointment of legal representation for the
12. See Taylor, supra note 7, at 335. At that time, some states permitted termination of
parental rights orders to be modified or vacated when new evidence was discovered or when there
was a change in circumstances that affected the child’s best interests. See, e.g., In re D.G., 583
A.2d 160, 169 (D.C. 1990) (vacating the termination order and remanding the case when adoption
was no longer a realistic possibility); Diane Riggs, Permanence Can Mean Going Home,
ADOPTALK (Spring 2006) (outlining process used in several New York cases to vacate the order
terminating parental rights), http://www.nacac.org/adoptalk/permanence.html [https://perma.cc/
6F8D-AVEG].
13. See, e.g., In re Cody B., 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 652, 658 n.8 (Cal. 2007) (quoting the lower
court stating “in the past I have had mother’s parental rights terminated and who readopted their
kids”). In In the Matter of M.O., No. M2007-003470COA-R3-PT, 2007 WL 2827373, at *2 n.1
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2007), the court noted that an adoption proceeding “would be the most likely
available means by which to seek a legal parent/child relationship where none exists, including
after a termination order.” In Thompson v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 353
So. 2d 197, 198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), the court stated that the children’s birth mother “may
petition the Circuit Court, as anyone else, for the right to adopt the children, and appropriate means
are available for a complete review of her petition.”
14. See, e.g., In the Interest of Konczak, 371 N.E.2d 136, 138 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977), in which
the court held that a birth mother had standing to seek custody under a statute that permitted any
person interested in the minor to apply to the court for a change in custody. In In re the Custody of
R.R.B., 31 P.3d 1212 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001), a biological father petitioned for custody of a child
nine years after his rights were terminated. The court upheld the lower court’s decision to grant the
petition by “conclud[ing] that the adoption laws d[id] not bar [the] petition.” Id. at 1216. The court
stated that “nothing in the adoption statutes preclude[d the father] from participating in a separate,
unrelated proceeding. And the cases involving dependency and involuntary termination of parental
rights [we]re distinguishable.” Id. Addressing the argument that allowing such petitions is against
the public policy of enhancing finality in adoption proceedings, the court stated that the biological
father’s “nonparent petition for custody d[id] not threaten the integrity of the adoption process.” Id.
15. See, e.g., In re Cody B., 153 Cal. App. 4th 1004, 1007–08 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (noting
biological mother’s request to be designated the presumed mother six years after the termination
order was entered).
16. See supra note 14.
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parent.17 In most jurisdictions, terminated parents are systematically excluded
from the process.
While reinstatement statutes contain the promise of post-termination
reunification, this article discusses ways in which these statutes both further and
frustrate that goal. This article examines the bias against parents whose rights
have been terminated reflected in reinstatement statutes. It further discusses how
these laws reinforce disincentives for parents to defend their fundamental right to
the care, custody, and control of their children. Parents who litigate against the
termination of their parental rights are penalized by laws and policies that give
preferential treatment to parents who voluntarily relinquish their parental rights.
Reinstatement statutes are compared against adoption laws that, in many states,
provide a better alternative for restoring the parent-child relationship. While state
interests support reinstatement statutes, the laws as currently written are
ultimately ineffective at best and harmful at worst.
II.
TERMINATED PARENTS AND LEGAL ORPHANS
In all fifty states and the District of Columbia, a parent’s rights to the care,
custody, and control of her children can be terminated voluntarily or
involuntarily.18 Voluntary termination is often referred to as “relinquishment.”19
Some states provide for voluntary termination of parental rights only if the
parent whose rights are to be terminated has consented in writing to the
termination and if the termination will be in the best interests of the child.20 By
contrast, the grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights are specific
circumstances under which the child cannot safely be returned home because of
risk of harm by the parent or the inability of the parent to provide for the child’s
basic needs.21 While the statutory grounds for termination vary, every state
provides by statute a mechanism for the involuntary termination of parental
rights.22
17. See supra note 11.
18. See, e.g., 1 Thomas A. Jacobs, Relinquishment and Consent, in CHILDREN & THE LAW:
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS § 3:11 (2016); Grounds for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights,
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, at 1 (Jan. 2013), https:
//www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/groundtermin.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ALN-R8PU]; Consent to
Adoption, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, at 1 (Apr. 2013),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/consent.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Y3W-NFPL].
19. See, e.g., In re Cesar L., 654 S.E.2d 373 (W. Va. 2007) (distinguishing between
involuntary termination and voluntary relinquishment of parental rights that sever the parent-child
relationship).
20. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.444 (West 2007); FLA. STAT. § 39.806 (2006).
21. See Grounds for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, CHILDREN’S BUREAU,
CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, at 2 (Jan. 2013), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs
/groundtermin.pdf [https://perma.cc/JLG3-2DVX].
22. See Jenina Mella, Termination of Parental Rights Based on Abuse and Neglect, 9 CAUSES
OF ACTION 2d 483 § 2 (2007) (finding that actions for the termination of parental rights in the
context of abuse, neglect, or dependency proceedings are the centerpiece of the child welfare
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Federal law establishes timelines in which states must either return the child
to her parents or initiate proceedings to terminate parental rights so the child can
be adopted. The Adoption and Safe Families Act (“ASFA”) requires that states
initiate termination of parental rights (“TPR”) proceedings for parents of
children who have been in care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months
(except in situations in which the child is placed safely with relatives, there is a
compelling reason why TPR is not in the child’s best interest, or the family has
not received the services that were included in the case plan).23 A termination
order legally severs a parent’s rights, privileges, and responsibilities regarding
her child.24 Traditionally, termination orders are final, unlike other custody
orders that can be modified and are not subject to res judicata.25
Of the 427,910 children who were in foster care on September 30, 2015, the
parental rights to 62,378 of them were terminated during that fiscal year.26
Agency records are customarily kept in the children’s names, so the number of
parents who have had their parental rights terminated is not known.27 Although
there are few studies about terminated parents,28 stereotypes and stock stories
create prevalent bias against them. These parents are commonly portrayed as
perpetrators of horrible crimes against their children—one-dimensional human
beings with no ability to change.29 These portrayals are perpetuated by the

adjudication system). In some states, only the state has standing to seek termination of parental
rights; however, other states grant standing to individuals, including those seeking to adopt the
child.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2015).
24. Termination of Parental Rights, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
25. While few courts have expressly held that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to
TPR cases, including those filed post-termination of the parents’ rights, far more have failed to rule
on the issue. See, e.g., B.J.H. v. State (In re Interest of T.J., A.H. & K.H.), 945 P.2d 158, 162 (Utah
Ct. App. 1997) (“[W]e need not reach the issue of whether different notions of res judicata should
be applied in termination of parental rights proceedings.”); State v. J.T. (In re Interest of J.J.T. &
T.J.T.), 877 P.2d 161, 164 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (“Thus we save for another day the difficult
question of whether, and to what extent, res judicata really applies in the context of termination of
parental rights.”). Some states have enacted laws that explicitly apply these doctrines to
termination orders. For example, the Tennessee statute prohibits a TPR to be overturned by any
court or collaterally attacked by any person or entity after one year from the date of entry of the
final order of termination. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-113(q) (2009).
26. AFCARS Rep. 23, supra note 2, at 1.
27. Leslie Doty Hollingsworth, Birth Mothers, in CHILD WELFARE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY: A HANDBOOK OF PRACTICES, POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS 424, 427 (Gerald P. Mallon &
Peg McCartt Hess eds., 2d ed. 2014).
28. Mary O’Leary Wiley & Amanda L. Baden, Birth Parents in Adoption: Research,
Practice, and Counseling Psychology, 33 THE COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGIST 13, 22 (2005) (“But
who are these parents who no longer have the legal right to parent their children? These parents
have been briefly and superficially described in the literature. The literature describes their
characteristics and tends to report reasons for the termination of rights . . . and birth mother
background histories . . . , but national statistics on these individuals, developmental histories, and
outcomes are difficult to determine.”).
29. See Matthew I. Fraidin, Stories Told and Untold: Confidentiality Laws and the Master
Narrative of Child Welfare, 63 ME. L. REV. 1 (2010) (discussing how the confidentiality behind
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media, which commonly describe child abuse as “brutal violence; children [as]
innocent victims; parents [as] deviant and monstrous; and children [needing to]
be separated from parents for their protection.”30 In her book Shattered Bonds,
Professor Dorothy Roberts provides a common narrative that was recounted on
National Public Radio’s Talk of the Nation the night ASFA was enacted:
Children removed from a home for their safety then returned
only to be killed; children who bounce from home to home for
years because a parent won’t surrender legal rights to the child
so he can’t be adopted; families collapsing under the weight of
dysfunction, drugs, poverty; where children are raped by mom’s
boyfriend or scalded, or starved, or beaten.31
Furthermore, because most parents whose rights are terminated are poor
people and people of color, they face institutional bias, which “can be attributed
to institutions such as the judicial system and children’s welfare agencies and
can be a reflection of the system of disadvantage . . . and oppression all too
commonly found in these institutions.”32 Racism and class oppression affect
these parents at every stage of the child welfare process, from investigation of
the allegation to reinstatement of their parental rights.33
In contrast to the common narrative about terminated parents, parents lose
their parental rights due to child neglect, as well as child abuse, and some have
had their rights terminated due to unpaid child support.34 The limited research on
outcomes for terminated parents has repeatedly found long-term psychological
distress associated with involuntary termination. Some common outcomes are:
(a) an ongoing sense of anger and guilt; (b) significant psychological problems;
(c) health problems usually associated with bereavement; and (d) relationship
problems.35 Not surprisingly, many parents, even after their parental rights have
been terminated, care deeply about their child’s wellbeing. As one terminated
parent stated, “I think it was unfair the way I lost them and it really has affected
my life, worrying about them, on a daily basis. Do they have enough food to eat,

child welfare cases silences children and their parents from offering a more nuanced narrative or
perspective of family court proceedings).
30. Id. at 8.
31. DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 114 (2002).
32. O’Leary Wiley & Baden, supra note 28, at 23.
33. Jina Lee, Zenobia Bell & Mae Ackerman-Brimberg, Implicit Bias in the Child Welfare,
Education and Mental Health Systems, NAT’L CTR. FOR YOUTH LAW (2015), https://youthlaw.org/
wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Implicit-Bias-in-Child-Welfare-Education-and-Mental-HealthSystems-Literature-Review_061915.pdf [https://perma.cc/VX5X-RCGM] (highlighting various
points where decision-makers might unconsciously rely on racial biases about families and
children of color when reviewing the facts of a child welfare case).
34. See, e.g., In re T.D.P., 595 S.E.2d 735, 738 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (terminating an
incarcerated father’s parental rights for nonsupport, when he earned between $0.40 and $1.00 a
day and had failed to send “an amount greater than zero” to support his infant daughter in foster
care).
35. O’Leary Wiley & Baden, supra note 28, at 23.
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are they being taken care of emotionally, how are they doing in school, and
questions like that.”36
Jurisdictions differ as to whether terminated parents still have any type of
legal interest in their child or merely an emotional one. At least two appellate
courts have recognized the existence of a legal interest after parental rights have
been terminated. In Wynn v. Superior Court, the Court of Appeals, Fifth District
of California, concluded that “the law recognizes some relationships between a
child and his or her biological parents even after an adoption has occurred.”37 In
In re Adoption/Guardianship Nos. 11387 & 11388, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland acknowledged “that a natural parent whose parental rights have been
terminated has some level of interest in the status of her biological children.”38
Likewise, many legal orphans want to remain emotionally connected to their
terminated parents. While there are no published studies on the relationship
between legal orphans and their biological parents,
numerous studies detail the strong ties most children in foster
care feel for their birth parents, even if their parents do not have
custody of them or they cannot be reunified. Children’s
attachments to even absent or very flawed parents are deep, as
parents play a significant role in the development of their
identity and self-esteem.39
A study of youth preparing to age out of foster care found that 63.6% felt close
to their biological mother and 35.9% felt close to their biological father.40
Furthermore, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence that many foster youth,
including legal orphans, who exit foster care without legal permanency return to
their biological parents.41 Thus, the court order terminating parental rights does
not, in fact, terminate the parent-child relationship.
III.
LEGAL ORPHANS AND PERMANENCY
The foster care system is designed to be temporary.42 The overarching goal
of the system is child permanency—specifically, legal permanence.43 However,

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Hollingsworth, supra note 27, at 434–35.
Wynn v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 86, 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
In re Adoption/Guardianship Nos. 11387 & 11388, 731 A.2d 972, 984 (Md. 1999).
Cynthia Godsoe, Parsing Parenthood, 17:1 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 113, 130–31 (2013).
MARK E. COURTNEY, SHERRI TERAO & NOEL BOST, MIDWEST EVALUATION OF THE ADULT
FUNCTIONING OF FORMER FOSTER YOUTH: CONDITIONS OF YOUTH PREPARING TO LEAVE STATE
CARE 25 (Chapin Hall Center for Children, Univ. Chicago 2004), http://www.chapinhall.org
/sites/default/files/CS_97.pdf [https://perma.cc/YC2Z-ZQKX].
41. See, e.g., Emancipated Foster Youth Returning to Birth Parents, HONORING
EMANCIPATED YOUTH, http://www.issuelab.org/resources/3855/3855.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YW3ZCUG] (last visited Apr. 18, 2017).
42. Foster Care, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY,
https://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/outofhome/foster-care/ [https://perma.cc/6Q88-U96Z] (last
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critics allege that while legal permanence “can create both relational permanence
and [physical] permanence, the pursuit of legal permanence at the expense of
relational and [physical] permanence may be contributing to a state of
impermanence among foster care youth.”44 In an effort to ensure a child’s timely
transition to a permanency, ASFA sets specific timeframes in which the state
must act on a child’s permanency plan.45 It prefers that children reunite with
their home of origin; this preference changes when the court determines that
returning home is no longer in the child’s best interest.46 Where that
determination is made, the state has an obligation to ensure the child’s move
toward another permanency option: adoption, legal guardianship, permanent
placement with a fit and willing relative, or “another planned permanent living
arrangement.”47
ASFA’s emphasis on legally secure permanent placement is meant to
provide the child with psychological stability and a sense of belonging and to
limit the likelihood of future disruption of the permanent relationship.48
Unfortunately, many legal orphans exit the foster care system without
permanency.49 As one author argues, “[i]t is inconsistent to argue that children’s
need for legal permanency justifies shortened timelines for permanency hearings
and TPR efforts, and then downplay the importance of legal permanency once
parental rights are terminated.”50 The lack of available options for legal orphans

visited May 5, 2017) (defining foster care as a temporary service provided by states for children
who cannot live with their families).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(C) (2014) (establishing specific timelines to achieve permanency
for foster youth).
44. Tonia Scott & Nora Gustavsson, Balancing Permanency and Stability for Youth in Foster
Care, 32(4) CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 619, 619 (2010) (defining relational (or
psychological) permanence as consisting of long-term, loving, and accepting relationships and
including relationships with parental figures such as biological parents; physical permanence as
consisting of stability in community; and legal permanence as consisting of a legal relationship
between the youth and a caretaker).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(C) (2014).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D) (2014).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(E) (2014).
48. See Chereese M. Phillips & Aaron Mann, Historical Analysis of the Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997, 23 J. OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN THE SOC. ENV’T 862 (2013); Cecilia Fiermonte
& Jennifer Renne, Making it Permanent: Reasonable Efforts to Finalize Permanency Plans for
Foster Children, AM. BAR ASS’N CTR. FOR CHILDREN & THE LAW (2002),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/child_law/2002_Making_It_Permane
nt.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/KGZ3-P98F].
49. The most current estimate is from 2009, when it was estimated that 4898 legal orphans
exited to non-permanency and 6474 legal orphans ages sixteen to eighteen were at risk of aging
out. Hon. Sharon McCully (Ret.), Legal Orphans, Permanent Families: Improving Outcomes by
Achieving Permanency for Legal Orphans, NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES
6 (2012), http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/LEGAL%20ORPHANS%20Webinar%20PPFina
l.pdf [https://perma.cc/57X3-4Y4S].
50. Brenda D. Smith, After Parental Rights Are Terminated: Factors Associated with Exiting
Foster Care, 25(12) CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 965, 980 (2003).
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has led to deleterious outcomes for these youth.51 As “[y]oung people ‘ag[e] out’
of the child welfare system,” they “undergo[] a dual transition—one from the
care of the system to autonomy and a second from childhood to adulthood—and
they face numerous challenges in making this transition and many experience a
range of negative outcomes.”52 Such outcomes include homelessness, contact
with the criminal justice system, mental and physical health problems, under- or
unemployment, educational deficiencies, and reliance on public assistance.53
Ironically, a youth’s legal orphan status is a direct result of the state’s effort
to provide permanence for the child. ASFA provides that adoption is preferred
when reunification with parents or primary caregivers is deemed impossible.54
To facilitate an adoption, the state petitions to terminate parental rights,
assuming those rights will be replaced by the adoption.55 That does not always
happen, however, resulting in nearly 63,000 youth with no legal connections.56
When the purpose for which parental rights were terminated—namely,
adoption—is no longer a viable option, state child welfare agencies have begun
to examine placement with terminated parents as a realistic permanency
option.57 To strengthen that placement, some states permit parental rights to be
reinstated.58
IV.
REINSTATEMENT OF PARENTAL RIGHTS STATUTES
In contrast to the temporary nature of the foster care system, TPR orders
have traditionally been considered permanent, and terminated parents legal
strangers to their biological child.59 For example, under the Alaska code, “a
decree terminating parental rights . . . voids all legal relationships between the
child and the biological parent so that the child is a stranger to the biological

51. Hon. Sharon McCully (Ret.) & Elizabeth Whitney Barnes, Forever Families: Improving
Outcomes by Achieving Permanency for Legal Orphans, NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY
COURT JUDGES 4 (2013), http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/LOTAB_3_25_13_newcover
_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2VJ-YTF2].
52. Rosemary J. Avery, An Examination of Theory and Promising Practice for Achieving
Permanency for Teens Before They Age Out of Foster Care, 32 CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVS. REV.
399, 402 (2010).
53. Id.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 675 (5)(C).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 675 (5)(E)(i)–(iii).
56. AFCARS Rep. 23, supra note 2.
57. See Riggs, supra note 12; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 400.207(6) (allowing the Michigan
Children’s Institute superintendent to enter into an agreement with a terminated parent to restore
physical custody without reinstating parental rights).
58. See supra note 11 (listing the seventeen states with reinstatement statutes).
59. But see LaShanda Taylor Adams, (Re-)Grasping the Opportunity Interest: Lehr v.
Robertson and the Terminated Parent, 25 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 31 (2015) (arguing that parents
retain some legal connections, through their opportunity interest, to their children after
termination).
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parent and to relatives of the biological parent for all purposes.”60 A similar
Washington statute declares that a termination order severs and terminates “all
rights, powers, privileges, immunities, duties, and obligations, including any
rights to custody, control, visitation, or support existing between the child and
parent.”61 Because of this finality, due process mandates proof by clear and
convincing evidence before parental rights can be terminated.62
Even before the advent of reinstatement statutes, however, termination
orders did not always lead to complete and irrevocable severance of parental
rights and responsibilities. Laws and policies mandate continuing obligations to
pay child support,63 ongoing rights of inheritance,64 continued access to social
security benefits,65 and post-termination contact.66 Post-termination contact
acknowledges that youths benefit from maintaining relationships with parents.
For legal orphans, post-termination visitation makes little sense when there is no
option for post-termination reunification; thus, states have begun to provide this
opportunity as an additional permanency option for these youths.
In 2005, the trend toward uniformly allowing terminated parents the
opportunity to restore their parental rights began in California.67 Legislation was
introduced in response to a court decision that expressed frustration with the
finality of the law as it existed at the time.68 In In re Jerred H., the First District
Court of Appeals invited the California Legislature to consider allowing the
juvenile courts limited discretion to reinstate parental rights where the child
would otherwise be left a legal orphan.69 The opinion suggested that “[t]o avoid
60. ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.130 (2017).
61. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.200 (2007).
62. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756–58 (1982).
63. See M.D.C. v. K.D., 39 So. 3d 1105 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (providing overview of state
case law deciding whether a parent’s obligation to pay child support ends when parental rights are
terminated); see also Theresa M. Pelfrey, Is the Termination of Parental Rights the Termination of
Parental Responsibility?, 13(6) GLOBAL J. HUMAN SOC. SCI. ARTS & HUMANITIES 13 (2013).
64. See Richard Lewis Brown, Undeserving Heirs?—The Case of the “Terminated” Parent,
40 U. RICH. L. REV. 547 (2006); Richard L. Brown, Disinheriting the “Legal Orphan”:
Inheritance Rights of Children After Termination of Parental Rights, 70 MO. L. REV. 125 (2005)
(noting that in some states, TPR statutes expressly provide that the right of the child to inherit from
the biological parent survives termination); see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-63 (2013) (“No
judgment of termination of parental rights . . . shall operate to terminate the mutual rights of
inheritance of the child and the parent or parents involved, or to terminate the legal duties and
liabilities of the parent or parents, unless and until the child has been legally adopted.”).
65. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM (POMS), PR 01215.028
MO. (June 14, 2006), https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/1501215028 [https://perma.cc/AF5ZG4AW].
66. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.811(7)(b) (2013) (providing for post-termination contact, in
some circumstances, by statute); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.2061 (2003).
67. See Assemb. B. 519, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005) (as passed Oct. 7, 2005); CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 366.26(i)(3) (2015) (providing a method for reinstating parental rights over a child who
has not been adopted).
68. A.B. 519, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005), www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/
asm/ab0501-0550/ab519cfa20050607161843sencomm.html [https://perma.cc/NQ8B-B6SQ].
69. In re Jerred H., 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 481, 485–86 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
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such an unhappy consequence, legislation may be advisable authorizing judicial
intervention under very limited circumstances following the termination of
parental rights and prior to the completion of adoption.”70
Developing the first reinstatement legislation was not easy. Adoption
proponents argued that families would be reluctant to adopt children from foster
care if they believed that a terminated parent might seek to interfere with a
pending adoption by means of the reinstatement process. One scholarly record
described the debate accordingly:
Legislative history from California, along with the consensus of
some practitioners in the field, indicates a fear that parents might
abuse the right to petition the court and disrupt the life of a child
who does not want to reunify with a parent. There were also
concerns in California among prospective adoptive parents that
an overly broad statute and the ability of a biological parent to
re-enter the picture would chill or destabilize prospective
adoptions.71
Proponents in Nevada faced similar challenges passing its reinstatement
statute. The common concern was that birth parents would create chaos in the
child’s life.72 One opponent stated, “I feel strongly that we do not go down that
road[.] I would hate to see a circumstance where a parent is, for example, in
prison and is sending petition after petition through the courts trying to regain
parental rights, disrupting the child’s life.”73 Over some objection and with some
compromise, the statute, which allows a Nevada court to restore parental rights if
a child is not likely to be adopted and if such reinstatement is in the child’s best
interest, was passed in 2007.74 Reinstatement statutes have also been enacted in
Washington,75 Louisiana,76 Oklahoma,77 Illinois,78 New York,79 Hawaii,80
Alaska,81 Maine,82 North Carolina,83 Virginia,84 Delaware,85 Utah,86
70. Id.
71. Randi J. O’Donnell, A Second Chance for Children and Families: A Model Statute to
Reinstate Parental Rights After Termination, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 362, 372 (2010).
72. Amanda Fehd, Law Would Let Courts Restore Parental Rights, NEV. APPEAL (Apr. 4,
2007), http://www.nevadaappeal.com/news/law-would-let-courts-restore-parental-rights/ [https://
perma.cc/KY3G-EGG8].
73. Id.
74. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 128.190(3)(a)–(b) (LexisNexis 2013).
75. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.215 (2011).
76. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1051 (Supp. 2012).
77. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-4-909 (West 2009).
78. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-34 (2013).
79. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 635–37 (McKinney 2012). The New York reinstatement statute is
only available if the basis for court involvement was abandonment, mental illness/intellectual
disability, or permanent neglect. Parents who have been found to have inflicted severe or repeated
abuse cannot petition for reinstatement of parental rights.
80. HAW. REV. STAT § 571-63 (2006).
81. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.089(h) (2010).
82. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 4059 (2011).
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Minnesota,87 Georgia,88 and Colorado.89 In 2015, acts concerning restoration of
parental rights were introduced in the Connecticut, Michigan, and Iowa
legislatures.90 In 2017, a bill was introduced in Arkansas.91
Individual reinstatement statutes vary, but they contain common provisions
detailing: (1) whether a waiting period is required before a motion or petition can
be filed; (2) the duration of trial home visits prior to the reinstatement of parental
rights; (3) the role of the child welfare agency; (4) the criteria for the entry of a
reinstatement order, including the standard of evidence and the required court
findings; and (5) the effect of the reinstatement order on the earlier termination
decree.92 Also common among the statutes are provisions relating to who can
file.93 Because of general distrust of biological parents and a belief that the best
interests of their children are not their paramount concern, most states deny
parents standing.94 Illinois has gone further by also imposing sanctions on
parents who are found to have interfered with a potential adoption. The law
requires that a motion to reinstate parental rights be dismissed with prejudice if
the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a parent intentionally
acted to prevent or otherwise disrupt the child’s adoption after relinquishing
parental rights.95
The fears expressed by opponents in California, Nevada, and elsewhere
have not borne out in New York, where terminated parents can petition for
reinstatement of their parental rights. The New York Family Court Act provides
that:
a proceeding to modify the disposition in order to restore
parental rights may be originated by the filing of a petition by the
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1114 (2013).
84. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283.2 (2013).
85. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1116 (2013).
86. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-1404 (LexisNexis 2013).
87. MINN. STAT. § 260C.329 (2013).
88. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-323 (2014).
89. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-612 (West).
90. See H.B. 6562, Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2015) (died in committee); S.B. 994,
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2014) (passed Senate, but died in House committee); H.B. 333,
86th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2015).
91. H.B. 1973, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017).
92. Reinstatement of Parental Rights State Statute Summary, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/reinstatement-ofparental-rights-state-statute-sum.aspx [https://perma.cc/4SSH-GVTN]; see also Meredith L.
Schalick, The Sky Is Not Falling: Lessons and Recommendations from Ten Years of Reinstating
Parental Rights, 51 FAM. L.Q. 2 (forthcoming Summer 2017) (on file with the author).
93. Id.
94. See O’Donnell, supra note 71.
95. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-34(3). A reinstatement of a parental rights bill pending
before the Arkansas legislature contains a similar provision: “(e) A court may deny a petition filed
under this section if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the parent who is the
subject of the petition engaged in conduct that interfered with the child’s ability to achieve
permanency.” H.B. 1973, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017).
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child’s attorney, by the agency or individual to whom
guardianship and custody of the child had been committed or by
the respondent or respondents in the termination of parental
rights proceeding.96
In 2010, the year the reinstatement statute was enacted, 43.3% of children in
New York’s foster care system exited to adoption.97 Five years later, 48.5%
were adopted.98 Despite the lack of evidence to support the need to
systematically exclude terminated parents and deny them standing, exclusionary
provisions remain. These and other anti-parent provisions in state reunification
statutes are solely based on bias against terminated parents.
A. Bias Against Terminated Parents Reflected in Reinstatement Statutes
The National Center for State Courts, in a publication designed to help
courts address bias, makes a distinction between explicit and implicit bias:
Unlike explicit bias (which reflects the attitudes or beliefs that
one endorses at a conscious level), implicit bias is the bias in
judgment and/or behavior that results from subtle cognitive
processes (e.g., implicit attitudes and implicit stereotypes) that
often operate at a level below conscious awareness and without
intentional control.99
In recent years, social scientists have attempted to determine whether
important decisions are shaped by these biases. Studies have found that implicit
bias influences professional decision-making, including decisions made by
judges and legislators.100 While the majority of research has focused on bias
associated with race, gender, and age, studies have found a correlation between
the individual’s bias and her decision-making. The authors of a recent study of
96. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 636(a). The respondent in the proceeding is the biological parent.
97. Kid’s Well-being Indicators Clearinghouse, NEW YORK STATE COUNCIL ON CHILDREN &
FAMILIES, http://www.nyskwic.org/get_data/indicator_profile.cfm?subIndicatorID=81 [https://
perma.cc/HA6M-4V92] (last visited May 3, 2017).
98. Id.
99. Helping Courts Address Implicit Bias: Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS 1 (2012), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Gender%20and%20Raci
al%20Fairness/Implicit%20Bias%20FAQs%20rev.ashx [https://perma.cc/PD3G-VFHN].
100. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Eberhardt , Paul G. Davies, Valerie J. Purdie-Vaughns & Sheri
Lynn Johnson, Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts
Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383 (2006); Matthew Mendez & Christian Grose,
Doubling Down: Inequality in Responsiveness and the Policy Preferences of Elected Officials
(2014) (Class Research Paper No. 14-17, University of Southern California),
http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2422596 [https://perma.cc/9U8E-7HJZ]. But see Jennifer G. May,
Decision-Making Processes of Judges in Family Court: An Investigation of Salient Features
Relating to Termination of Parental Rights Hearings 47 (May 2015) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of South Carolina), http://scholarcommons.sc.edu /cgi/view content. Cgi?
article=4145&context=etd [https://perma.cc/DD44-AM29] (“Despite acknowledging that their
background experience impacts the way they process information on the bench, judges did not
perceive their own personal background making a difference in their ultimate decision.”).
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legislator preference and responsiveness bias101 theorize that the policy
preferences of legislators may be biased due to electoral, personal, and resource
considerations.102 Thus, there is no reason to believe that those creating and
enforcing reinstatement laws are immune from the effects of implicit and explicit
bias against parents whose rights were terminated due to abuse or neglect.
The single-story narrative that parents who have involvement with the child
welfare system are abusive, drug-addicted, or uncaring ignores the realities of
why parental rights are terminated. Parents lose their parental rights due to child
neglect,103 rather than child abuse, and some have had their rights terminated
due to unpaid child support.104 Historically, stock stories of horrific child abuse
and child death have been used to justify the passage of legislation that adversely
affects parents. For example, “[a]dvocates drummed up support for ASFA by
pointing to cases where family preservation failed miserably. They recounted
tragic stories of children who were killed after caseworkers returned them to
blatantly dangerous parents. They passed around photographs of abused children
to members of Congress.”105 These persuasive narratives were designed to
discourage reuniting children with parents whose rights had not yet been
terminated. The assumption is that those concerns must only be amplified when
one considers post-termination reunification. Thus, it is not surprising that
reinstatement laws and policies reflect bias against terminated parents. Once
adjudicated as “bad,” it is nearly impossible for them to shed the label and prove
that they are “good” enough to have their parental rights reinstated.106 This
skewed image has resulted in reinstatement statutes that disempower parents
while empowering youth, create a disincentive for parents to challenge the
state’s effort to terminate their parental rights, and encourage unpredictability in
the law.

101. “Responsiveness bias is when legislators respond to some constituents’ requests more
than others due to the constituents’ backgrounds.” Mendez & Grose, supra note 100, at 4.
102. Id. at 13.
103. AFCARS Rep. 23, supra note 2, at 1.
104. See, e.g., In re T.D.P., 595 S.E.2D 735 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that sufficient
grounds existed to terminate parental rights of father, who failed to use prison wages to pay any
portion of costs of child’s foster care).
105. DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 107 (2002)
(telling the story of ASFA advocates’ efforts to persuade Congress to pass ASFA by arguing to
Congress and the public that the needs of children and family reunification were at odds, and that
foster child safety was being jeopardized by family reunification policies). Advocates also wrote
inflammatory newspaper articles with titles like “The Little Boy Who Didn’t Have to Die” and
“Family Preservation—It Can Kill.” Id. at 107–08.
106. See Richard Cozzola & Andrya Soprych, Representing Parents in Civil Child Protection
Cases, 31 FAMILY ADVOCATE 22, 22 (2009) (“A fear that ‘something bad might happen if the child
is returned’ permeates the proceeding. Thus, although U.S. Supreme Court precedent has
repeatedly held that family integrity is a fundamental right, the in-court reality often is the
opposite.”).
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B. Disempowering the Terminated Parent
The state child welfare department plays a major role in any TPR case
involving a child in foster care.107 These departments are also similarly involved
in reinstatement cases. In most states, these departments not only have standing
to file petitions, but they also serve as the points of contact for terminated
parents.108 Few states, however, require the department to respond to the
parent’s request for information or to act on her inquiry.109 As one parent
advocate noted, “These parents won’t have the ability to potentially access this
bill through [] the . . . social worker who may be too overburdened and too busy
to add this onto their task list.”110
Few parents feel comfortable contacting the department after their rights
have been terminated, especially if the termination was involuntary. According
to the sociologists Kathy Mason and Peter Selman,
The adversarial process means evidence has to be gathered by
social workers for presentation in court to support their case for
the adoption of the child against their parents’ wishes. It is the
selective nature of this evidence which gives most concern to
non-relinquishing birth parents, many of whom feel they are
being blamed for everything.111
In a study of non-relinquishing birth parents, participants were asked who they
would and would not go to for help if in the future they wanted to contact their
children.112 Mason and Selman reported “a mixture of responses, one or two
being adamant that they would not go to social services for help.”113 Only a few
acknowledged that they would have to contact the social services agency that
handled their child’s case.114

107. See Understanding Child Welfare and the Courts, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CHILD
WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY (2016), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/cwandcourts.
pdf [https://perma.cc/UFN3-QX7E].
108. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-612 (West); see also Carla Burks, Mission Impossible:
CPS Is Helping to Reconnect My Son and Me Even Though I Lost My Rights, RISE MAGAZINE
(May 2, 2013), http://www.risemagazine.org/2013/05/mission-impossible/ [https://perma.cc/
R8GF-3TRH] (“After a period when I wasn’t in touch with anyone at CPS, I was contacted by a
Texas child protective caseworker. He wanted to know if I was interested in reuniting with my
son.”).
109. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-612 (West). The Colorado Administrative Code is
unusual in that it requires the county to notify the guardian ad litem within thirty calendar days
after the contact if a terminated parent contacts the county inquiring about reinstatement of
parental rights. See 12 COLO. CODE REGS. 2509-4:7.301.24(S)(4)(c). The county must also provide
the guardian ad litem with the name and address of the terminated parent. Id.
110. Fehd, supra note 72.
111. Kathy Mason & Peter Selman, Birth Parents’ Experiences of Contested Adoption, 21(1)
ADOPTION & FOSTERING 21, 24 (1997).
112. Id. at 26.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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This unwillingness to work with the social services agency stems from
complicated identity issues within the caseworker-parent relationship. Research
on the topic noted that “differences in financial resources and educational levels
mark a social distance between caseworker-parent pairings which can be
profoundly felt by the parent accused of neglect.”115 Reinstatement statutes
reinforce this uneven power dynamic. In a survey of eighteen parents who had
experienced child protection intervention, sixteen parents spoke of child
protection services using power “over” them in ways they considered negative,
seven of whom considered this power to be “absolute,” “tyrannical,” or
“frightening.”116 Studies have confirmed this feeling of powerlessness even
when the parent was represented by legal counsel.117 Because parents seeking to
have their rights reinstated have no access to counsel, the power imbalance can
have a significant impact on their ability to work toward post-termination
reunification.118
Even if a parent communicates her interest in post-termination reunification
to the state child-placing agency, the social worker determines her “worthiness”
to have rights reinstated.119 Anecdotal evidence suggests that caseworkers and
others working in the child welfare system are “firmly entrenched in the belief
that ‘once a bad parent, always a bad parent.’ Rather than assess the deeper
causes of child maltreatment, workers may erect barriers to reinstatement out of
115. Jennifer Sykes, Negotiating Stigma: Understanding Mothers’ Responses to Accusations
of Child Neglect, 33 CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 448, 449 (2011).
116. Gary C. Dumbrill, Parental Experience of Child Protection Intervention: A Qualitative
Study, 30 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 27, 30 (2006). In another study, social workers were described
as: judgmental (forty-six percent); cold and uncaring (forty-four percent); poor listeners (thirtyeight percent); critical (thirty-eight percent); and insincere (twenty percent). Sarah Maiter, Sally
Palmer & Shehenaz Manji, Strengthening Social Worker-Client Relationships in Child Protective
Services: Addressing Power Imbalances and ‘Ruptured’ Relationships, 5 QUALITATIVE SOC. WORK
167, 179 (2006). While there are no current studies of parents involved in the United States foster
care system, a published first-hand account reveals that this power imbalance is also prevalent in
the United States. Jeanette Vega, ‘Keep a Sharp Eye Out for People Like Me’: Speech to Child
Welfare Investigators and Attorneys, RISE MAGAZINE (May 23, 2016), http://www.risemagazine
.org/2016/03/keep-a-sharp-eye-out/ [https://perma.cc/9TUD-CPMZ] (“The workers had so much
power over me, and I was in so much pain. I really needed them to explain things to me in a
reasonable way. Instead, they were quick to judge and took the worst out of me.”).
117. See Mason & Selman, supra note 111, at 24 (“A major problem for several birth parents
had been getting good legal representation, and many were unhappy with their solicitors. . . . Many
of these solicitors had little experience of working with such types of cases and the parents felt
their cases had not been presented in court as well as they might have been.”); LYNN CHARLTON,
MAUREEN CRANK, KINNI KANSARA & CAROLYN OLIVER, STILL SCREAMING: BIRTH PARENTS
COMPULSORILY SEPARATED FROM THEIR CHILDREN 38 (After Adoption 1998) (“[Birth parents]
looked to their solicitors for a more personal advocacy and were often dismayed to find that
solicitors were ‘playing a game.’ . . . Many birth parents lost faith in their solicitors and changed
them in panic at the time of key hearings.”).
118. Studies have found that reunification was positively associated with caseworkers’
engagement with the biological family. See Tyrone C. Cheng, Factors Associated with
Reunification: A Longitudinal Analysis of Long-Term Foster Care, 32 CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVS.
REV. 1311, 1314 (2010).
119. Godsoe, supra note 39, at 153–54.
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a stereotype that parents whose rights have been terminated will never be worthy
of parenthood.”120 These barriers might explain why few petitions for
reinstatement have been filed nationwide.121
C. Empowering the Foster Child
As previously stated, restrictions on who may file a petition for
reinstatement of parental rights varies from state to state. However, the majority
of states permit the youth to file for herself, either as the only person with
standing or in combination with the department.122 These statutes reflect the
belief among some child welfare practitioners that the affected youth should
initiate the petition.123 Little research has been done on whether the youth’s
minority might compromise her ability to assume this responsibility, however.
Furthermore, “research indicat[es] that abused and neglected children tend to
trail behind other children in a range of developmental spheres,”124 and
reinstatement statutes requiring child initiation do not adequately account for
these developmental setbacks.
Children do not commonly receive this degree of decision-making authority
in the welfare system. Youth have no standing to petition the court to terminate
their parents’ rights; nor do they have standing to object to the termination of
their parents’ rights.125 In many states, the foster youth is not even present
during termination or adoption hearings on the basis that126 “[t]he state has
traditionally shielded children from the adversarial system because children are
deemed to lack the requisite capacity and experience to function in such an
environment.”127
Empowering the child while simultaneously disempowering the terminated
parent has contributed to the under-utilization of reinstatement laws.128 As one
proponent warned, where

120. Id.
121. Schalick, supra note 92. The recent study has collected data for six states: Colorado,
Delaware, Maine, Minnesota, Virginia, and Washington. Colorado enacted its reinstatement statute
in 2014 and averages just over one reinstatement a year. Delaware enacted its statute in 2013 and
averages one a year. Maine enacted its statute in 2011 and averages one a year. Minnesota enacted
its statute in 2013 and averages six a year. Virginia enacted its statute in 2013 and averages less
than one a year. Washington enacted its statute in 2007 and averages eight a year.
122. Id.
123. See O’Donnell, supra note 71, at 372.
124. See Emily Buss, Confronting Developmental Barriers to the Empowerment of Child
Clients, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 895, 918 (1999).
125. Claudio DeBellis & Marta B. Soja, Gregory K.: Child Standing in Parental Termination
Proceedings and the Implications of the Foster Parent-Foster Child Relationship on the Best
Interests Standard, 8 J. CIVIL RIGHTS & ECON. DEV. 501, 507 (1993).
126. See Erik S. Pitchal, Where Are All the Children? Increasing Youth Participation in
Dependency Proceedings, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 233 (2008).
127. DeBellis & Soja, supra note 125, at 501, 507–08 (1993).
128. See Schalick, supra note 92.
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the child’s lawyer and the Department of Human Services
disagree with the child’s petition, or the child is too young to
know that his parent is rehabilitated, . . . it may be placing too
much of a burden on children by permitting them to be the only
party that can petition the court.129
Youth are often shielded from prior stages of the child welfare proceedings for
their protection; thus, it is incongruous, and even harmful, for them to be given
authority to initiate the reinstatement process.
D. Rewarding Voluntariness or Punishing Parents for Exercising Their
Rights?
Several states, either through their reinstatement statutes or through case law
deciding whether to reinstate parental rights, have drawn a distinction between
voluntary and involuntary termination. In In re the Custody of R.R.B., the Court
of Appeals of Washington held that adoption laws did not bar a biological father
from filing a petition for custody.130 The court distinguished between voluntary
relinquishment and involuntary termination, finding that involuntary termination
precludes a parent from participating in all future proceedings involving the
child, while voluntary relinquishment only prevents the parent from further
participation in a particular proceeding.131
Similarly, in In the Matter of M.O., the Court of Appeals of Tennessee
interpreted a Tennessee statute to permit reinstatement of parental rights where a
parent has consented to a TPR or voluntarily surrendered parental rights.132 The
court was “unwilling to hold that there are no circumstances in which a parent
whose rights have been terminated by court order may have his or her legal
relationship with a child reinstated.”133 This language suggests that parents
whose rights had been involuntarily terminated would have to overcome a higher
burden to have their rights reinstated.
Both of the states that allow parents the right to petition for reinstatement of
parental rights, Alaska and New York, limit applicability to certain parents.134
Alaska’s reinstatement of parental rights statute, for example, permits only
parents who voluntarily relinquished their parental rights to request a review
hearing where, upon a showing of good cause, the court can vacate the
termination order and reinstate parental rights.135 Thus, reinstatement is
unavailable to parents who made attempts to retain their parental rights.

129. O’Donnell, supra note 71, at 372.
130. In re the Custody of R.R.B., 31 P.3d 1212, 1215 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
131. Id. at 1216.
132. In the Matter of M.O., No. M2007-00347-COA-R3-PT, 2007 WL 2827373, at *1 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2007).
133. Id. at *2 n.1.
134. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 635–37; ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.089.
135. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.089 (West 2016).
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The legal distinction between those who relinquished and those who did not
is not universal. Some states treat all parents similarly, regardless of how their
rights were terminated. Texas adoption law, which denies standing to terminated
parents to initiate a case, makes no distinction between voluntary and
involuntary terminations.136 In In Interest of Hughes, the appellant, who
voluntarily relinquished her rights, argued that the statute violated her right to
due process because “it treats alike persons whose parental rights have been
involuntarily terminated and those who have voluntarily relinquished their
rights.”137 The court denied the claim, finding a rational relationship between the
statute and the state’s interest in “prevent[ing] parents who have lost or given up
their rights to their children from later attempting to adopt them.”138
There is no reason for differential treatment based on the voluntariness of
the termination. The literature on the subject notes:
[T]he distinction between voluntary and involuntary
relinquishments is actually a continuum rather than a dichotomy.
Whereas some birth parents who sign voluntary relinquishment
papers actually feel coerced by loved ones, spouses, parents, or
even their culture . . . to relinquish their children, other birth
parents who formerly have their rights terminated by the court
system can be in agreement with that plan.139
Whether a parent ultimately decides to relinquish her parental rights also says
little about the underlying facts of the case.
The trend toward encouraging relinquishment and punishing parents who
challenge the termination of their rights is in line with ASFA and post-adoption
contact legislation. ASFA mandates that a parent who unsuccessfully challenges
the state’s efforts to sever her legal relationship with her child is not entitled to
reasonable efforts to reunite her with other children who might be in the foster
care system.140 One study found an eighteen-percent decrease in the number of
involuntary terminations after the enactment of ASFA and held that a
corresponding increase in voluntary relinquishments may be attributable to the
penalty that ASFA imposes on parents whose rights have been involuntarily
terminated.141 This penalty, the state’s ability to bypass reunification efforts, is

136. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.006 (West 2007).
137. In Interest of Hughes, 770 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. App. 1989).
138. Id.
139. Wiley & Baden, supra note 28, at 21.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii) (2012).
141. Hilary Baldwin, Termination of Parental Rights: Statistical Study and Proposed
Solutions, Legislative Reform, 28 J. LEGIS. 239, 274 (2002) (noting that in the year that ASFA
became effective, nearly ninety-six percent of all terminations were involuntary, compared to
seventy-eight percent in 2000).
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“rooted in research that indicated that some abusive parents were beyond
rehabilitation.”142
Voluntary termination provides an opportunity for post-adoption contact
that is unavailable if a parent contests the termination petition.143 When faced
with the prospect of having their rights terminated involuntarily and never seeing
their child again, many parents choose to relinquish voluntarily after negotiating
a post-adoption contact agreement.144 This decision can be reinforced and
encouraged by attorneys working with the parents. “Lawyers merely need to tell
parents that the chances of dismissing an involuntary termination are remote and
the clients should choose voluntary termination because it comes with the
potential for future visitation.”145
No evidence supports the notion that relinquishing parents are more likely to
position themselves to have their rights reinstated. In fact, the opposite may be
true. Some research suggests that parents whose rights are involuntarily
terminated have as much, if not more, motivation to rehabilitate than those who
voluntarily relinquish their rights. A study of birth mothers’ experiences of being
compulsorily separated from their children found that the former
found themselves renegotiating their identity to move away from
the stigma of being labelled a “bad” or “failed” parent. For some
this meant that they tried to “better” themselves by finding a new
career, moving away and getting out of destructive relationships,
and many expressed a wish to “repair themselves”.146
The much-reported case of Peggy Fugate and her daughter Selina McBride
illustrates the change that terminated parents can make in an effort to repair
themselves. When her parental rights were involuntarily terminated, Ms. Fugate
was addicted to cocaine and had been in and out of jail, serving three separate
prison sentences for theft.147 After several years, she entered recovery, married,
obtained full-time employment, and was living in stable housing with enough
room for her daughter.148 Summing up her efforts toward rehabilitation, Ms.
142. Øyvind S. Tefre, The Justifications for Terminating Parental Rights and Adoption in the
United States, 48 CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 87, 90 (2015).
143. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.2061(a) (West 2014).
144. Baldwin, supra note 141, at 274–75.
145. Id. at 275.
146. Nina Memarnia, Lizette Nolte, Clare Norris & Alex Harborne, ‘It Felt Like It Was Night
All the Time’: Listening to the Experiences of Birth Mothers Whose Children Have Been Taken
into Care or Adopted, 39 ADOPTION & FOSTERING 303, 311 (2015). Two cases in states with
reinstatement statutes illustrate this point: In In re Dependency of G.C.B, 870 P.2d 1037 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1994), married couple Megan and Wade Lucas sought to adopt Mrs. Lucas’s biological child
nearly a year after she voluntarily relinquished her parental rights, and in Theresa O. v. Arthur P.,
809 N.Y.S.2d 439 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2006), a biological mother who surrendered her parental rights
filed a petition to adopt after the child had been adopted by his foster parents.
147. Sharon Coolidge, Mom Wants to Adopt Daughter She Lost, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (Oct.
28, 2004), http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2004/10/28/loc_fosterkid.html [https://perma.cc
/52FM-FENL].
148. Id.
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Fugate declared, “People can change. I’ve changed so much, I deserve a second
chance.” Despite her efforts toward post-termination reunification, the court
determined that she had no standing to seek custody of her daughter.
V.
CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARD TERMINATED PARENTS
In her article Parsing Parenthood, Cynthia Godsoe criticizes reinstatement
statutes, writing, “Rather than address the underlying risks and challenges to
families that result in child welfare involvement, reinstatement statutes instead
purport to distinguish between the incorrigibly bad parents and the select few
bad parents who can be redeemed. Accordingly, reinstatement is framed as an
exceptional measure for morally worthy families.”149 Over time, the notion of
who is “worthy” has changed in some states. Alaska and Illinois provide two
illustrative examples of states where the definitions of worthiness have evolved
in sometimes counterintuitive ways.
Current Alaska law permits parents who voluntarily relinquished their
parental rights to request a review hearing, upon a showing of good cause, to
vacate the termination order and reinstate parental rights.150 The statute requires
a good cause showing and proof by clear and convincing evidence that
reinstatement is in the child’s best interest and that the parent is rehabilitated and
capable of providing the care and guidance that will serve the moral, emotional,
mental, and physical welfare of the child.151 Such a request can only be made
before the entry of an adoption or legal guardianship decree.152 There is no
similar statutory provision for parents whose rights were terminated
involuntarily,153 which creates a disincentive for parents to defend their
fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of their children. Parents who
litigate against the termination of their parental rights are foreclosed from being
reunited with their children post-termination. Alaska law did not always
discriminate in this way.
Before Alaska Statute section 47.10.089 was enacted in 2005, parents whose
rights were involuntarily terminated were permitted to petition for review
hearings to reinstate their parental rights before their children had been adopted.
In Rita T. v. State, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that “parents are entitled to
a review of the order terminating their parental rights upon a showing of good
cause for the hearing.”154 The court added, “While it may not be true of all,
some parents are capable of changing and overcoming the problems that caused

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Godsoe, supra note 39, at 150.
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.089(h) (2005).
Id.
Id.
See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.088 (2005).
Rita T. v. State, 623 P.2d 344, 347 (Alaska 1981).
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the termination of their parental rights.”155 Not only did the court grant standing
to a birth parent whose parental rights had been terminated involuntarily, the
court granted the application for a hearing after adoption proceedings had
commenced. The court explained its decision by emphasizing the effect of a final
decree of adoption, which had not yet been entered. The court reasoned that prior
to an entry of a final decree of adoption, a legal relationship between the parent
and child still exists.156
Twenty-four years after Rita T. was decided, the Supreme Court of Alaska
in Alden H. v. State narrowly defined the Rita T. holding to apply only to parents
whose parental rights had been terminated involuntarily, stating, “We have never
decided whether the right announced in Rita T. is available to parents who
voluntarily relinquish their parental right . . . and we need not address this issue
here.”157 The issue was addressed in 2005 by the enactment of Alaska Statute
section 47.10.89, which provides:
After a termination order is entered and before the entry of an
adoption or legal guardianship decree, a person who voluntarily
relinquished parental rights to a child . . . may request a review
hearing, upon a showing of good cause, to vacate the termination
order and reinstate parental rights relating to that child. A court
shall vacate a termination order if the person shows, by clear and
convincing evidence, that reinstatement of parental rights is in
the best interest of the child and that the person is rehabilitated
and capable of providing the care and guidance that will serve
the moral emotional, mental and physical welfare of the child.158
This, combined with the repeal of the statute upon which the Rita T. decision
was based, created a system that rewarded parents for voluntarily relinquishing
their parental rights.
It is unclear why some parents are rewarded while others are not. The theory
that “parents who voluntarily surrender their rights are more worthy than those
whose rights are terminated after contested hearing”159 can be refuted by Lara S.
v. State, which illustrates the overwhelming similarities between cases where
parents surrender their parental rights and where rights are terminated
involuntarily.160 There, the mother struggled with a cocaine addiction, failed in
two inpatient treatment programs, and experienced difficulty working on her
case plan.161 After the permanency goal was changed to adoption and a petition
to terminate parental rights was filed, the mother relinquished her rights.162 By
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id.
Alden H. v. State, 108 P.3d 224, 231 (Alaska 2005).
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.089(h).
Godsoe, supra note 39, at 149 n.220.
Lara S. v. State, 209 P.3d 120 (Alaska 2009).
Id. at 121.
Id. at 123.
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doing so, Alaska law granted her standing to petition for reinstatement.163
However, if she had contested the termination and failed, she would have had no
ability to file. This case further illustrates the rewards given to parents who do
not litigate against efforts to terminate their fundamental rights.
A similar change in attitude toward terminated parents has occurred in
Illinois. The Appellate Court of Illinois in Partington v. Illinois Department of
Children & Family Services held that a mother whose rights were terminated by
valid consent could assume the preferred status of “parent” in petitioning to
adopt her biological daughter.164 There, the mother filed an adoption petition
sixteen months after executing a “Final and Irrevocable Surrender to an Agency
for Purposes of Adoption of a Born Child.”165 The child was three years old at
the time of the filing.166 On the issue of standing, the court held, “The
‘termination’ of the parent’s right by her giving consent to an adoption should
not prevent the parent from seeking to establish new rights by independent
adoption proceedings so long as there has not been an intervening placement for
adoption.”167 Several years later, the Illinois legislature amended the adoption
statute’s definition of “related child,” rejecting the result reached in
Partington.168 The amendment provides that a parent who has executed a final
irrevocable consent to adoption or a final irrevocable surrender for purposes of
adoption or has had her parental rights terminated is not “related” to her child.169
The changing attitude toward terminated parents and their “worthiness” to
reunite with their children post-termination reflects a general bias and
unwillingness to accept that rehabilitation is possible. Furthermore, frequently
changing attitudes create unpredictable outcomes for terminated parents seeking
to legally reconnect with their biological children. Such uncertainty makes it
difficult for parents’ attorneys and advocates to represent terminated parents in
reinstatement and TPR proceedings.
VI.
UNEXPECTED CHALLENGES FOR PARENTS’ ATTORNEYS
Attorneys representing parents in TPR proceedings face an uphill battle. Not
only must parents’ attorneys combat the evidence presented at trial, they also
must litigate against the ever-present “bad mother” stereotype.
The task of identifying and attacking the stereotype in the
prevalent cultural consciousness and unconsciousness has been,
and continues to be, onerous. But the challenge of confronting

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 125 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.089).
Partington v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 414 N.E.2d 540 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
Id. at 541.
Id.
Id. at 542.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(B) (2017).
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(B), (E) (2017).
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the “bad mother” figure in contexts where it is unquestionably
clear that a mother has caused harm to her children has been
even more difficult.170
As a result, it is no wonder the majority of petitions to terminate parental rights
are granted. National data is unavailable but a study of the outcome of TPR
hearings in New York State in 2015 revealed that 50.7% of proceedings resulted
in a termination judgment.171 While parents’ attorneys expect certain challenges,
reinstatement statutes present an unexpected one.
A 2009 study exploring judicial perspectives and experiences around TPR
proceedings found that “some judges are concerned about the prospect of
creating legal orphans, and the absence of an identified adoptive family does
make some judges more apprehensive about TPR.”172 Of the judges interviewed,
forty-five percent indicated that they were concerned with the possibility that
children whose parental rights were terminated would not subsequently be
adopted “due to: 1) not having an identified adoptive resource in place before
TPR and/or 2) different child characteristics, such as older age, that make it more
difficult to find an adoptive resource for them.”173 The surveyed judges further
indicated that their concerns about creating legal orphans are reflected in the
varied practices surrounding TPR proceedings. Specifically, nearly forty percent
(nine of twenty-four judges) reported that, in most cases, they grant motions to
terminate parental rights only after an adoptive family is identified.174
With the advent of reinstatement statutes, some judges no longer view the
creation of legal orphans as a concern. In In re Deandre D., the Appellate Court
of Illinois failed to reach the issue of whether a court could give consideration to
the possibility that parental rights might be reinstated in the future when
determining whether TPR was in a child’s best interest.175 There, the trial judge
stated:
[G]iven that the law has recently changed as well, the parents do
have the option of coming forward if several years down the line
he is still not in a pre-adoptive placement and it would be in his
best interest to vacate this termination order, given the changes
in the law, it would be in my power to do so.176

170. Marie Ashe, The “Bad Mother” in Law and Literature: A Problem of Representation,
43 HASTINGS L.J. 1017, 1020 (1992).
171. Kids’ Well-being Indicators Clearinghouse, supra note 97.
172. Raquel Ellis, Karin Malm & Erin Bishop, The Timing of Termination of Parental Rights:
A Balancing Act for Children’s Best Interests 1, CHILD TRENDS (2009), http://www.child
trends.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/Child_Trends-20090909RBLegalOrphans.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A4BW-S582].
173. Id. at 6.
174. Id. at 7.
175. In re Deandre D., 940 N.E.2d 246 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
176. Id. at 252.

ADAMS_PUBLISHERPROOF_9.10.17.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

532

N.Y.U. REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE

11/12/2017 10:18 PM

Vol. 41:507

The California Court of Appeals, the intermediate appellate court, has also
cited reinstatement laws as the basis for affirming lower court termination
decisions. For example, in In re S.O., the California Court of Appeals stated:
The concern about “legal orphaning” of children . . . is
outmoded, however, in that the statute . . . provides that if a child
has not been adopted after three years following the termination
of parental rights, the child may petition the juvenile court to
reinstate parental rights. Thus, under the current statute, there is
no danger of any child becoming a legal orphan.177
Similarly, in In re T.K., the California Court of Appeals stated that the
Legislature “obviated” the concern of a child becoming a legal orphan when it
enacted the reinstatement statute.178 The lack of concern over the creation of
legal orphans as a result of reinstatement statutes will inevitably lead to more
termination orders, thereby creating an extra and unanticipated challenge for
attorneys representing parents in TPR proceedings.
When deciding whether and to what extent terminated parents should be
permitted to reinstate their parental rights, states must determine which
governmental interest prevails when there is a conflict—specifically, whether the
state’s interest in ensuring finality of termination orders179 trumps its interest in
achieving permanence for youth in foster care.180 States have indicated an
interest in ensuring the finality of the termination order.181 Through the
enactment of reinstatement statutes, however, they have begun to move away
from absolute finality when in the child’s best interests.182 Several reinstatement
177. In re S.O., No. E048744, 2010 WL 570491, at *18 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2010)
(referencing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.36).
178. In re T.K., No. E057082, 2013 WL 647609, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2013).
179. See In re M.M., 589 N.E.2d 687, 690 (Ill. App. 1 Dist. 1992) (“The finality of an order
terminating parental rights should be of primary concern since the termination order is the first step
in the adoption procedure and there is a strong public policy favoring finality and stability in
adoptions. If we were to allow for a conditional termination of parental rights, it would leave the
question of termination of parental rights open to attack indefinitely, thereby jeopardizing the
entire adoption scheme.”); In re Sade C., 920 P.2d 716, 796 (1996) (acknowledging the state’s
“strong” interest in the expeditiousness of dependency proceedings and its “stronger” interest in
the finality of orders affecting children).
180. Casey Family Services has put forward a comprehensive definition of permanence:
having an enduring family relationship that is (1) safe and meant to last a lifetime; (2) offers the
legal rights and social status of full family membership; (3) provides for physical, emotional,
social, cognitive and spiritual well-being; and (4) assures lifelong connections to extended
family, siblings, other significant adults, family history and traditions, race and ethnic heritage,
culture, religion, and language.
Lauren L. Frey, Sarah B. Greenblatt & Jim Brown, A Call to Action: An Integrated Approach to
Youth Permanency and Preparation for Adulthood, CASEY FAMILY SERVS. 3 (2005),
http://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/AECF-AnIntegratedApproachtoYouthPermanency-2005.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K7QQ-EVTU].
181. States have an interest in ensuring finality of orders terminating parental rights. See In re
M.M., 589 N.E.2d at 690; In re Sade C., 920 P.2d at 796.
182. An appellate court in Florida, which does not have a reinstatement statute, also rejected
the notion that finality should be maintained at all costs. See, e.g., C.A. v. Dep’t of Child. &
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statutes acknowledge this tension by indicating that the reinstatement has no
effect on the underlying termination order. Specifically, Hawaii, Oklahoma,
Washington, and Colorado statutes provide that granting the petition for
reinstatement does not vacate or otherwise affect the validity of the original
order terminating the parent-child legal relationship.183 Therefore, the state’s
interest in the finality of its termination order is not undermined.
Unrelated to child safety and permanency, states might also have fiscal
concerns that support allowing reinstatement of parental rights and other forms
of post-termination reunification. The pending bill in Michigan notes:
If a child were removed from foster care and returned to a parent,
the State, and in some cases the county where the child resided,
would no longer pay for foster care services for the child. In FY
2013–14, the projected average annual cost of care for a foster
care child is $26,978.184
Although other state fiscal impact statements do not acknowledge the cost
savings,185 it is clear that states pay less for children who exit foster care prior to
emancipation.186 Thus, states have at least two governmental interests that
support the enactment of reinstatement statutes that encourage utilization.
A. Another Option for Reinstatement of Parental Rights: Adoption
Because reinstatement statutes provide few options for terminated parents,
some parents have sought to adopt their children to restore their legal
relationship with their biological child.187 Adoption is “the creation by judicial
Families, 16 So. 3d 888, 890 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th 2009) (“[T]he State’s interest in vindicating
judgments presumed correct must give way to that paramount concern, the best interests of the
child . . . .”).
183. See supra notes 75, 77, 80 & 89.
184. S. 994, 113th Cong. (Mich. 2014), https://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/20132014/billanalysis/senate/pdf/2013-SFA-0994-G.pdf [https://perma.cc/EBG6-LYPF].
185. For example, neither the fiscal impact statement filed in 2012 nor the statement filed in
2013 in support of reinstatement of parental rights bills in Virginia acknowledge the cost savings
that results from early exit from foster care. See DEPARTMENT OF P LANNING AND BUDGET: 2013
FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT, S.B. 1076, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2013),
https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?131+oth+SB1076F122+PDF [https://perma.cc/6LPEFY3X]; DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND BUDGET: 2013 FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT, H.B. 450, Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012), https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?131+oth
+HB450F122+PDF [https://perma.cc/92X8-V6S3].
186. A recent study found a significant cost benefit to exiting children to permanency.
Although the study focused on one permanency option, adoption, it is arguable that states would
enjoy similar fiscal benefits when children who would have otherwise remained in foster care exit
to post-termination reunification. Nationally, states spend $25,782 per child per year on
administrative and maintenance costs associated with foster care. In addition to this cost, the study
found longer-term savings in lessened financial burden on public education systems, social welfare
agencies, and the criminal justice system. Nicholas Zill, Better Prospects, Lower Cost: The Case
for Increasing Foster Care Adoption, 35 ADOPTION ADVOCATE 1 (May 2011),
https://www.adoptioncouncil.org/images/stories/NCFA_ADOPTION_ADVOCATE_NO35.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RHQ7-7YCW].
187. See Taylor, supra note 7, at 338–39.
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order of a parent-child relationship” between the adopted child and the adoptive
parents “with all the rights, privileges, and responsibilities that attach to that
relationship.”188 Thus, the biological parent once again becomes the child’s legal
parent through the adoption process. Individual state courts have decided
whether to allow parents to establish new rights by independent adoption
proceedings.189 In states where re-adoption is permitted, terminated parents
might find this to be a better option. Not only do they have standing to initiate
the proceeding, they may do so without regard to a waiting period or the age of
the child.190
As will be discussed below, states such as Illinois, California, and North
Carolina permit birth parent re-adoption while also having reinstatement statutes
that deny standing to terminated parents. Others, such as Florida and Tennessee,
do not have reinstatement statutes but allow re-adoption. Still other states allow
reinstatement and not adoption, and some states provide no mechanism for
terminated parents to restore their parental rights.
B. Adoption and Reinstatement
Terminated parents in Illinois, California, and North Carolina have two legal
options for having their parental rights restored: adoption and reinstatement.
While the Illinois reinstatement statute only gives standing to the state child
welfare department and the minor,191 another Illinois law allows a terminated
parent to adopt her child if that child was adopted previously by a relative and
that relative can no longer provide care due to disability or death.192 The law
was passed soon after the case of a mother who wished to adopt her biological
children after their adoptive mother, their biological maternal grandmother, had
died.193 The lawyer who drafted the law did so because “she wanted to establish
a process for [the] specific situation so that the outcome would not have to
depend upon how willing a judge was to change a previous decision.”194
While limited to specific circumstances when a child is adopted by a blood
relative, the law provides greater benefit to terminated parents and their children
than the reinstatement statute. The adoption law grants standing to the parent to
bring the case and allows restoration of parental rights for those who would have

188. Adoption, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
189. See Taylor, supra note 7, at 338–39.
190. See Who May Adopt, Be Adopted, or Place a Child for Adoption?, CHILDREN’S BUREAU,
CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY (2015), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/parties
.pdf#page=3&view=Who may be adopted? [https://perma.cc/M48M-LZCF].
191. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-34(1).
192. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/14.5 (2017).
193. Ali Elkin, Chicago Mother First to Adopt Her Own Children Under New Law, CNN
(July 7, 2011), http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2011/07/07/chicago-mother-first-to-adopt-her-ownchildren-under-new-law/ [https://perma.cc/2CQS-63DM].
194. Id.
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otherwise aged out of the foster care system.195 Parents who do not meet the
narrow definition for standing can restore their parental rights through the state’s
reinstatement statute.
California law provides that any unmarried minor may be adopted by an
adult at least ten years older than her.196 Prior to the passage of its reinstatement
law, parents in California had been permitted to adopt their biological children
post-termination.197
Terminated parents in North Carolina need not rely solely on case law.
North Carolina statute provides that “a former parent may readopt a minor
adoptee.”198 One of the primary purposes of the statute is “to advance the
welfare of minors by facilitating the adoption of minors in need of adoptive
placement by persons who can give them love, care, security, and support.”199
The statute permitting re-adoption became effective in 1996,200 while the state
did not enact its reinstatement statute until 2011.201
At first blush, it may seem unnecessary for a state to permit both re-adoption
and reinstatement of parental rights. From the parent advocate’s perspective, the
reinstatement statute provides no benefit and is a less viable option. However,
from the vantage point of the child or state, the reinstatement process may
provide additional opportunities for post-termination reunification. While neither
the child nor the agency can petition for adoption, they can petition for
reinstatement. In cases where a parent does not have the resources to hire an
attorney to initiate the adoption process,202 the resources available to the child
and the child-placing agency might be used to facilitate reinstatement of parental
rights.
C. Adoption, Not Reinstatement
States such as Florida and Tennessee have not introduced or passed
statutory language allowing for reinstatement of parental rights. Perhaps
legislators have not seen the need to enact reinstatement statutes since readoption is an available avenue for reinstating parental rights. In Thompson v.
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, the District Court of Appeal of
195. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/14.5 (2017). The first cases filed under this law involved
twenty-four-year-old twins.
196. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8601(a).
197. In re Cody B., 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 652, 658 n.8 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“[I]n the past I have
had mother’s [sic] parental rights terminated and who readopted their kids.”).
198. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-6-101 (1995).
199. S.B. 159, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1995).
200. Id.
201. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1114.
202. Adoptive Families Magazine conducts an annual survey on the cost of adoption in the
United States. The most recent study estimated attorney fees for a foster care adoption to be $610.
Cost & Timing of Adoptions in 2013–2014, ADOPTIVE FAMILIES MAGAZINE (2015),
https://www.adoptivefamilies.com/resources/adoption-news/adoption-cost-and-timing-2013-2014/
[https://perma.cc/VUD8-MF6B].
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Florida held that a terminated mother could petition, as anyone else, to adopt her
biological children.203 The mother argued that, where adoption proceedings have
not been instituted, the statute should not preclude the court from hearing a
terminated parent’s custody petition.204 She further argued that unless permitted
to re-open the proceeding, she would have no avenue to seek custody.205 While
barring her claim to custody, the court found that the statute did “not preclude
her from establishing new rights through independent adoption proceedings.”206
Likewise, in In the Matter of M.O., the Court of Appeals of Tennessee
interpreted a Tennessee statute to permit reinstatement of parental rights where a
parent has consented to a TPR or voluntarily surrendered parental rights.207 It
noted:
The State has suggested that the only proper method available would be
a petition for adoption . . . . We do not disagree that such a proceeding
would be the most likely available means by which to seek to establish a
legal parent/child relationship where none exists, including after a
termination order.208
Where re-adoption is an option, parents may find that it offers more
flexibility and greater access to justice than reinstatement statutes. If states that
currently allow birth parents to adopt enact reinstatement statutes, the goal
should be to broaden, rather than limit, opportunities for post-termination
reunification.
D. Reinstatement, Not Adoption
Terminated parents in Washington can have their rights reinstated through
the reinstatement process but are prohibited by case law from petitioning to
adopt. Washington’s reinstatement of parental rights statute was enacted in
2007.209 At that time, there were 10,418 youth in its state foster care system and
2855 youth waiting for adoption.210 Of those waiting, 2147 were legal
orphans.211 Under the Washington statute, a child who has not achieved
permanency within three years after TPR may petition to have her parents’ rights
reinstated.212 The statute was passed fourteen years after the Washington Court
203. Thompson v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 353 So. 2d 197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977).
204. Id. at 198.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. In the Matter of M.O., No. M2007-00347-COA-R3-PT, 2007 WL 2827373 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Sept. 28, 2007).
208. Id. at *2 n.1.
209. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.215.
210. Child Welfare Outcomes 2007–2010: Report to Congress, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 340–41 (2012), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/cb/resource/cwo-0710 [https://perma.cc/V85W-QKRB].
211. Id. at 341.
212. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.215(1)(c) & (d).
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of Appeals, the intermediate appellate court, held that “a parent whose rights
have been terminated may not relitigate that issue through a petition for
adoption, or through any other legal proceeding.”213 In that case, a terminated
mother sought to adopt her biological child nearly fifteen months after she
voluntarily relinquished her parental rights.214 With the passage of the
reinstatement statute, there is hope that adoption will become an option.
E. No Reinstatement, No Adoption Without Consent
Generally, reinstatement statutes have been enacted in response to concerns
over the growing number of legal orphans. Although Texas has recognized that it
must address this problem, there has been no movement toward the enactment of
a law permitting parental rights to be reinstated when in the child’s best
interest.215 As previously discussed, those rights could be restored through
reinstatement or adoption.216 Texas does not have a reinstatement of parental
rights statute; adoption is only permitted if the parent has “the consent of the
child’s managing conservator, guardian, or legal custodian to bring the suit.”217
The purported governmental interest that supports this statute is the “interest in
promoting the welfare of children and ensuring that ‘children’s lives are not held
in limbo while judicial processes crawl forward.’”218
In In the Interest of R.N.R.R., the Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the
trial court’s dismissal of a biological father’s adoption petition.219 The biological
father had voluntarily relinquished his parental rights nearly nine years prior to
filing the petition to adopt.220 Under Texas law, he lacked standing and the
Court of Appeals refused to create an exception.221 The court noted, “Children
voluntarily given up in compliance with the Family Code . . . cannot be snapped

213. In re the Dependency of G.C.B., 870 P.2d 1037, 1043 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
214. Id. at 1039–40 (explaining that the Relinquishment of Custody and Consent to
Termination/Adoption was signed on August 12, 1992, and the Adoption Petition was filed on
November 1, 1993).
215. Texas is a participant in the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges
(“NCJFCJ”) Legal Orphans Project. Judge R. Michael Key, President of the NCJFCJ 2010–2011,
initiated the NCJFCJ Legal Orphans project as an ad hoc committee, with the goal that juvenile
and family courts across the United States focus their attention on the legal orphans within their
jurisdictions. States with large populations of children in foster care, and thus the greatest numbers
of legal orphans, were invited to participate in this project, with the goal of reducing the numbers
of legal orphans in those states, and provide practice recommendations for all court systems
seeking similar results. The Legal Orphans Project focuses on legal orphans ages fourteen and
above who are at risk of aging out of foster care. See Forever Families, supra note 51.
216. Supra Part VIA.
217. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.006(b)(2) (West 2007).
218. In re A.M., 312 S.W.3d 76, 86–87 (Tex. App. 2010) (quoting In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d
340, 353 (Tex. 2003)).
219. In the Interest of R.N.R.R., No. 11-06-00142-CV, 2007 WL 2505629, at *2 (Tex. App.
Sept. 6, 2007).
220. Id. at *1.
221. Id.

ADAMS_PUBLISHERPROOF_9.10.17.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

538

N.Y.U. REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE

11/12/2017 10:18 PM

Vol. 41:507

back at the whim of the parent.”222 As a result of the lack of post-termination
reunification options in the state, there were over 13,000 youth in Texas waiting
to be adopted in 2013.223 Unknown, however, is how many could exit to
permanency rather than age out without any legal connections.
VII.
CONCLUSION
Nearly twenty years have passed since my law school clinic partner and I
helped our client vacate the court order terminating her parental rights. Since that
time, seventeen states have enacted laws that permit parental rights to be
reinstated. Reinstatement statutes provide an avenue through which legal
orphans and their birth parents can legally reconnect. While on their surface
these statutes appear promising, they evidence a bias against terminated parents
that impact their efficacy. Furthermore, in some states, reinstatement laws
provide fewer opportunities to terminated parents than were available previously.
While reinstatement statutes contain the promise of post-termination
reunification, family defense attorneys, advocates, and legislators must be
mindful of the ways these statutes both further and frustrate that goal. Effective
advocacy on behalf of families requires knowledge of existing laws and
awareness of the potential bias against terminated parents, both implicit and
explicit. Only with this knowledge and awareness can reinstatement statutes
accomplish their goal of reducing the number of youth that age out of the foster
care system without permanent connections.

222. Id. (quoting Brown v. McLennan Cty. Children’s Protective Servs., 627 S.W.2d 390,
394 (Tex. 1982)).
223. Child Welfare Outcomes: 2010–2013 Report to Congress, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 317 (2016), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files
/cb/cwo10_13.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6HM-LGKF]. Of the 13,123 waiting to be adopted, 9230 are
legal orphans. Id.

